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Summary 
Under what conditions can government interventions in the financial sector be a successful 
tool to increase the financial resources available for productive investment in sub-Saharan 
Africa? This is the question which drives this paper. The relevance of research on this issue is 
widely acknowledged: There is strong empirical evidence that access to finance for private 
investment is essential for enterprise development and economic growth. However, most fi-
nancial systems in sub-Saharan Africa are highly exclusive and poorly developed in terms of 
size and efficiency. The lack of financial intermediation into higher levels of domestic in-
vestment primarily results from market failures which make the provision of financial ser-
vices to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) prohibitively costly or unattractive. 
Historically and in line with welfare economic theory market failures have provided an argu-
ment for activism, defined as deliberate government interventions in the financial sector to 
promote the delivery of financial services to segments of the private sector that are under-
served. The experience with activism has been mixed at best. However, even though activism 
does not guarantee an increase in broad-based productive private investment, past experience 
suggests that achieving this goal without deliberate government interventions is difficult, if 
not impossible. For this reason there is a renewed interest in the question of how far govern-
ment interventions in financial markets could promote finance for development. 
This paper makes three main arguments. 
 First, it argues that the current consensus that the effectiveness of activism depends on 
politics and good governance offers a realistic way forward, but that the associated policy 
implications remain unclear. This is due to a lack of a fully developed positive approach 
to government activism, and thus a framework which helps evaluating ex ante whether the 
government of a particular country has good enough governance to assume an activist role 
in the financial sector. Without such ex ante predictors, development practitioners will 
find it difficult to prioritise reform policies and to define an adequate role for a govern-
ment, ranging from modernist (putting a strong emphasis on markets over governments) 
to activist. Moreover, without such a framework there is the risk of spending resources on 
policies which are unlikely to succeed, spreading disenchantment with aid and leaving Af-
rican countries without the financial services they urgently need. 
 Second, political economy could provide the theoretical foundation for a framework to 
assess whether government interventions in a particular country are likely to succeed: By 
focusing on endogenous policy choice, political economy allows the modelling of policy 
choices as the outcome of a bargaining process of various interest groups cutting across 
state and society. 
 Third, political economy not only helps to evaluate the chances of a successful implemen-
tation of activist policies, but also to draw policy implications for those countries which 
currently are not likely to have good enough governance to successfully pursue activist 
policies. 
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The paper seeks to contribute to the development of such a political economy framework by 
sketching some determinants of financial policy choice as a way to begin thinking about the 
potential of activism in a particular country: It introduces an approach based on the existing 
literature on the political economy of finance in the developing world. Thereby this paper 
points out key determinants of financial policymaking which could be used to weigh the em-
pirical support for using activism as a tool to increase finance for private investment in a par-
ticular country. The approach proposed in this paper seeks to explain or predict policy choices 
through the analysis of coalitions of interest between private banks, private companies and 
public agencies. The existing literature suggests that the nature of a particular coalition and its 
capacity to determine financial policies, are shaped by the historical organisation of the pri-
vate sector and the revenue base of the state. 
If the political economy analysis indicates that political conditions are such that government 
entities have adequate governance to pursue activist policies effectively, then there are, in line 
with welfare economic theory, convincing arguments for development practitioners to support 
experiments with well designed pro-market activist policies, such as credit guarantee 
schemes, as temporary devices to complement modernist approaches. It is more often than not 
the case that the political environment in poor countries is unfavourable to activism, so that 
governments should pursue alternative strategies for encouraging economic development. 
Political economy suggests two major strategies for policymakers in countries with an unfa-
vourable environment: One possibility is to try to change the power relationships within soci-
ety, for instance through encouraging political entrepreneurship to empower financially ex-
cluded groups. The alternative is to work within the political environment and, for example, 
improve the functioning of second-best institutions, such as relationship-lending. 
These arguments entail a new way of thinking about how to decide on spending resources to 
build inclusive financial systems, as they address questions of political feasibility which, de-
spite the rhetoric that it is necessary to go beyond the technicalities of policymaking, have not 
yet received serious attention in the debate on financial reform. 
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1 Introduction 
How can governments in the political and economic environments typical of sub-Saharan 
Africa intervene to increase the financial resources available for productive investment? 
This is the question which drives this paper. The policy relevance of research on this 
question is widely acknowledged: There is strong empirical evidence that an efficient and 
inclusive financial system is essential for private investment, and ultimately economic 
growth.1 However, the majority of African financial systems are highly exclusive: In Af-
rica2, more enterprises than in any other part of the world report that access to finance is a 
major constraint to their operations, and particularly small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) lack access to external investment resources (Honohan / Beck 2007, 166). More-
over, even relative to other developing countries, financial systems in Africa have re-
mained poorly developed in terms of size and efficiency (Allen et al. 2010; Honohan / 
Beck 2007). 
The lack of financial intermediation into higher levels of domestic investment results to a 
substantial extent from market failures which make providing financial services to SMEs 
prohibitively costly or, due to an uncompetitive market environment, unattractive.3 The 
need for banks to down-scale operations and find less expensive ways of serving SMEs is 
limited, as banks operate very profitably: Subsidiaries of foreign banks in sub-Saharan 
Africa have higher returns on assets than subsidiaries of the same banks in other world 
regions (Honohan / Beck 2007, 36). In light of the alarming situation in the financial sec-
tors of many African countries there is a renewed interest among policymakers in the 
question how governments could govern the financial sector so that it better serves the 
needs of the real economy. 
African policymakers asking this question received different advice in different eras of 
economic thinking: Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s there was a consensus that develop-
ing country governments should assume an activist role and intervene directly in the fi-
nancial sector to increase outreach, the dominant view in the 1980s and 1990s during the 
Washington Consensus was that governments should take their hands off the financial 
markets. Today the appropriate role of the state in the financial sector is still a controver-
sial issue: Acknowledging that the private financial sector has often not been very suc-
cessful in providing finance for productive private investment, the debate now focuses 
less on whether governments should intervene, but rather on the degree and the best way 
to intervene (Beck et al. 2009). The key proposition of the current consensus on the role 
of government is that governments should focus on creating an enabling environment and 
on supporting activist actors outside the government, thus promoting access to finance. 
Moreover, based on more recent experiences, it is increasingly accepted in some parts of 
the debate that governments could themselves assume an activist role if they have appro-
                                                 
1 For an overview of the finance-growth nexus, see Levine et al. (2000) or Beck et al. (2007). 
2 Unless stated otherwise, the term ‘Africa’ in this paper refers to sub-Saharan Africa. 
3 While there are a number of potential constraints to the expansion of firm credit in Africa (including the 
limited number of bankable projects) this paper focuses on financial market failures, because opinions 
tend to be highly polarised on the role of public action in addressing imperfect financial markets. 
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priate governance (Beck et al. 2009; De la Torre et al. 2007). So far, however, there is 
only a dearth of research exploring the circumstances under which activist government 
interventions could be a successful tool to increase the financial resources available for 
productive investment in developing countries. 
This paper makes three main arguments. 
 First, it argues that while the current view on the role of government in the promotion 
of access to finance offers a realistic way forward towards making finance work for 
Africa, the associated policy implications remain unclear. The reason is the lack of a 
fully developed positive approach to government activism which provides a frame-
work helping to evaluate ex ante whether a government has the political will and ca-
pacity for efficiently playing an activist role. This paper seeks to contribute towards 
developing such a framework as this would help development practitioners assess 
whether activist government interventions have a chance of success in a particular 
country. 
 The second argument is that political economy could provide the theoretical founda-
tion for such a framework, because political economy allows to model policy choices 
as the outcome of a bargaining process between interest groups cutting across state 
and society. 
 The third argument is that a political economy framework would not only help evalu-
ating the chances of efficient government interventions but could also inform policy-
making in countries which currently lack the conditions to govern finance through ac-
tivist policies. 
These arguments build upon two strands of literature: The welfare economics argument in 
favour of government interventions to address market failures and an interest group 
model of political economy focusing on the role of state-private sector relationships. Em-
pirically the arguments are based on experiences with activism in the developing world 
within and outside of Africa. Thereby this paper focuses on the role of government in 
banking and not in the securities market, because banks still account for the vast majority 
of financial sector assets in poor countries (excluding central bank assets) (Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. 2008, 10). 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 examines in more detail the current consensus 
on the potential of activist government interventions to increase access to finance for pri-
vate productive investment. It begins by presenting the welfare economics argument in 
favour of activism and proceeds with an overview of the experience with activism and of 
the new, more political perspective on government activism. Section 3 discusses the prob-
lems development practitioners currently face when it comes to prioritising reforms with-
out having a positive theory of activism. Section 4 sketches some starting points for think-
ing about the determinants of efficient government interventions in the financial sector 
and explores how such a framework could inform policymaking. Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Activism in financial markets: Theoretical perspectives and practical 
experiences 
This section discusses the current consensus on the potential of government activism to 
promote greater outreach of financial systems to the private sector. It begins by exploring 
the rationale for activist government interventions, and compares this welfare economics 
point of view to the actual experience with government activism over the past five dec-
ades. Most examples are drawn from Africa, but some also refer to Asia or Latin America, 
where the debate on the potential of activism has been similar. The remainder of this sec-
tion discusses the role attributed to politics in the current view on activism. 
Before delving into the arguments, it is necessary to offer a definition of activism, a popu-
lar term in the current debate on access to finance.4 Since the question behind this paper is 
how African government officials can intervene to increase finance for productive private 
investment, the definition proposed here is very broad: A government is referred to as ac-
tivist when it deliberately intervenes in the financial sector to promote the outreach of fi-
nancial services to segments of the private sector which have been underserved. The dis-
cussion focuses on SMEs in agriculture and industry as examples for underserved seg-
ments. Although it is not only governments that can play such an activist role, but also the 
private sector (in particular non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) or foreign donors, if 
not stated otherwise activism in this paper refers to government activism. 
2.1 The welfare economics argument in favour of activism 
From a welfare economics point of view, there might be a case for government interven-
tion when market failures need to be corrected. The financial sector relies heavily on gath-
ering and processing information, as well as on the enforcement of contracts. This makes 
finance prone to a variety of market failures which, if not corrected, limit the outreach of 
financial services (Besley 1994; Stiglitz / Weiss 1981). The following examples from the 
market for corporate lending in developing countries shed some light on how market fail-
ures can make providing credit to SMEs prohibitively costly and less profitable than the 
alternative options of commercial banks, such as serving large corporations or govern-
ments. 
Asymmetric information (especially adverse selection and moral hazard) and enforcement 
problems add substantially to the transaction costs for lenders: Due to such market fail-
ures, lenders need to spend resources to screen and assess the creditworthiness of borrow-
ers and monitor them. In poor countries these costs are particularly high as SMEs often 
lack a credit history or formal and stable sources of revenue or assets which can be used as 
collateral. 
                                                 
4 For an introduction to the terminology see the World Bank report “Making Finance Work For Africa” 
by Honohan and Beck (2007, in particular page 7-12). 
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Moreover, private banks may not find it worthwhile to incur the high costs of screening 
and monitoring SMEs because, once these borrowers have a good credit history, they can 
obtain credit from other lenders, who will not have to bear the initial costs for screening. 
This suggests that information on creditworthiness is basically a public good, in the sense 
that it is non-rival in consumption and it is very costly to exclude anyone from using it. 
When the market fails to let banks appropriate the returns of information about their cos-
tumers, banks will under-invest in the acquisition of such information.5 
Besides asymmetric information, enforcement problems and the public good character of 
borrower information, high minimum efficient scales in the provision of financial services 
may impede the functioning of credit markets: Credit, like the provision of other financial 
services, involves fixed costs and to a certain extent, increasing returns to scale. If finan-
cial markets are small, as in most African countries, the lack of economies of scale sub-
stantially adds to the unit costs of transaction. Low population densities exacerbate this 
problem. Moreover, high minimum efficient scales increase market concentration, which 
eventually – although not necessarily – reduces competition and increases prices.6 
If the costs for providing credit are high and have a negative effect on profits, then there 
should be an incentive to innovate and find less expensive ways of providing credit. Yet, 
market failures reduce investments in credit market innovations to a point below what is 
socially optimal: Innovations are a public good and therefore innovators bear all the costs 
in case of failure, but find it difficult to prevent other investors from adopting the new 
technology once it has proven successful. Without the possibility to internalise more of the 
positive externalities they create, the incentive for private banks to invest in socially prof-
itable but financially relatively unattractive innovations will remain low, particularly if 
markets are uncompetitive and easy outside options are available. 
In sum, high transaction costs reduce the profitability of dealing with SMEs, particularly 
in light of the small amounts of money involved in transactions with these clients. More 
attractive alternatives, such as serving large enterprises with tangible assets that can be 
used as collateral and which fit to the existing business model, tend to lower the banks’ 
incentives to reduce prices, compete for market shares in underserved segments or to in-
novate and find more inexpensive ways of serving SMEs. Moreover, the failures of the 
credit market in developing countries tend not only to reduce the supply, but also the de-
mand for credit: If the unit costs of provision are high, credit becomes less affordable for 
some smaller firms such as SMEs and this in turn reduces the demand for credit from the 
formal banking sector. 
                                                 
5 The fact that setting up credit registries usually requires banks to share credit information about borrow-
ers also provides an explanation for the slow progress in credit registry development in sub-Saharan Af-
rica. 
6 The high degree of concentration in most of Africa’s banking systems partly results from the small size 
of national markets. Honohan and Beck (2007, 41) report that the market share of the top three banks 
(concentration ratio) in each country averages 73 percent across 22 African countries, based on total as-
sets in the latest year for which data are available. This figure compares with 60 percent for the world as 
a whole. The market dominance by a small number of banks, points to considerable market power 
which, as will be explored in section 4.1, is associated with substantial economic power and influence 
on political decision making. 
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These examples demonstrate how market failures can impede the development of inclu-
sive financial systems. They provide an argument based on welfare economic theory and 
information economics that some form of government intervention going beyond financial 
regulation and supervision to remove market failures might increase social welfare.7 
Thereby governments should choose their policy to mitigate a particular market failure 
depending on the nature of this market failure, in order to achieve the best possible eco-
nomic outcome.8 For instance, if the major constraint on the operation of a payment sys-
tem is a problem of scale and small market size, policies which spur regional financial 
integration might be appropriate. In cases where several ways of addressing a specific 
market failure are possible, welfare economic theory suggests that governments should 
seek to implement those policies which address the market failure most directly and pro-
vide the highest benefits at the lowest costs. 
Thus, normative economic theory does not only provide a basis for considering activism 
as a way to enhance social welfare but also offers some guiding principles for choosing 
and designing government interventions. However, contrasting these theoretical insights 
with actual experiences, suggests that governments often lack the capacity or willingness 
to design activist policies in a way that they achieve the positive outcome predicted by the 
theory. 
2.2 The experience with activism 
Assessing the actual experience with activist policies is not straightforward: First, it is 
difficult to provide empirical evidence of whether economic growth or productive invest-
ment would have been higher or lower in the absence of interventions, the counterfactual. 
Second, convincing evidence on whether the government-supported expansion of financial 
services increases private investment remains limited due to the non-random nature of 
interventions: While private banks favour serving governments and large companies, ac-
tivist policies tend to target less developed sectors and companies. The associated selec-
tion bias complicates the identification of the causal impact of activist policies on the pri-
vate sector. Third, returns of activist policies may be long-term, which makes it difficult to 
assess the success of more recent and in the short-term sometimes even distorting activist 
policies. 
For these reasons, the following historical overview on the experience with activism 
adopts a broad definition of what constitutes a successful activist policy: While a narrow 
definition would consider activist policies only as successful when they increase invest-
ment, economic, sectoral or enterprise development, policies are also categorised as suc-
cessful in this section, if they increase the outreach of financial services to the target 
group. 
                                                 
7 For a more extensive discussion see for instance Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
8 An early discussion of this argument provides Bhagwati (1971). 
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Decades of market-replacing activism 
In the 1960s and 1970s governments in developing countries were expected to play a 
prominent role in the financial sector: In line with welfare economic theory the consensus 
was that the lack of bank finance for private investment was a result of market failures 
(Gerschenkron 1962). It was part of mainstream economic thinking that an active public 
sector involvement in mobilising and allocating financial resources was called for to over-
come market failures in order to broaden access to finance for groups and sectors that 
were shut out of the formal financial market, such as poor households, agriculture and 
sectors depending on long-term finance. This activist approach towards financial sector 
development was part of a broader interventionist agenda which regarded governments as 
drivers of the development process and sought to replace markets which failed to generate 
growth and substantially reduce poverty. 
The main instrument to broaden access to finance in developing countries during the pe-
riod of market-replacing activism was directly providing funds through public or devel-
opment banks. By the 1970s the state in developing countries owned on average 65 per-
cent of the assets of the largest banks as compared to about 40 percent in developed coun-
tries (De la Torre et al. 2007, 13). In those countries that had adopted central planning and 
had nationalised the banking system, such as Guinea, Tanzania or Benin, government-
owned banks even constituted the entire banking system. Governments used public or de-
velopment banks to support the pursuit of their developmental agenda through the selec-
tive allocation of credit. Consistent with the market failure rationale, government-owned 
banks sought to focus on areas where private markets failed, such as agricultural lending 
(Brownbridge et al. 1998). 
In theory government-owned banks might have an advantage over private banks in in-
creasing outreach through, for instance, better access to information, exploiting economies 
of scale, being less risk averse or solving the problems of externalities. However, the 
overall experience with public banks has been negative: There is strong empirical evi-
dence that greater government participation in bank ownership is associated with lower 
levels of financial development, less credit to the private sector, wider intermediation 
spreads, slower economic growth and recurrent fiscal drains (La Porta et al. 2002). How-
ever, there are case studies at the country-level which find that some public banks, such as 
the village bank system of Bank Rakyat in Indonesia (Yaron et al. 1998), the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand (Townsend / Yaron 2001) or to 
some extent the Botswana Development Corporation (Harvey 1998, 20) were quite suc-
cessful in reaching out to their targeted clientele, while still operating financially viable. 
Another major tool for broadening access in developing countries was the imposition of 
lending requirements which obliged private banks to allocate a certain share of their loans 
(often at preferential interest rates) to priority sectors or regions. In East Asia, all countries 
directed credit to varying degrees (Stiglitz / Uy 1996). In India, only about 20 percent of 
bank deposits were allocated freely, the rest had to be invested in government bonds or 
was directed to priority sectors such as agriculture and SMEs. In Brazil, commercial banks 
were required to allocate between 20 and 60 percent of their sight deposits to agriculture 
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(De la Torre et al. 2007, 15-16). In Africa, this form of activism was most extensive in 
planned economies such as Tanzania, where nationalised banks provided direct credit al-
locations to public enterprises and priority sectors on the basis of their annual plans. Yet, 
even in countries where banks were relatively independent of the government, private 
banks were pressed to extend loans to public sector enterprises and government projects 
(Daumont et al. 2004, 40). 
The experience with directed credit programmes has been negative in most developing 
countries: On average these programmes failed to reach their intended beneficiaries and 
more influential borrowers were favoured (World Bank 2005, 165). In some countries, 
such as Ghana or Nigeria, sectoral lending requirements were on the books, but not ap-
plied effectively (Daumont et al. 2004, 25). However, there are examples of successful 
directed credit programmes, although most of them from East Asia (Stiglitz / Uy 1996; 
Vittas / Cho 1996). 
Another common tool to broaden access to finance in rural areas was to compel banks 
wishing to expand their networks of urban branches to also set up branches in rural areas. 
A prominent example is the Indian experiment of the late 1970s and 1980s, where the 
government imposed the so-called 1:4 license rule. This rule stated that banks could only 
open one branch in an already banked location if they opened four in unbanked locations 
(Burgess / Pande, 2005). Other countries where rural branching legislations were in place 
include Nigeria, Zambia and Botswana (Brownbridge et al. 1998).  
The effectiveness of such legislation has at best been mixed. In Botswana and many other 
countries where rural branching legislation was tried, it was not enforced effectively 
(Brownbridge et al. 1998; Daumont et al. 2004). While the prominent rural branch expan-
sion programme in India demised due to high bank loan default rates, it is also regarded as 
one of the success stories: The rule not only caused banks to open relatively more rural 
branches in Indian states with lower initial financial development and broadened access to 
finance, but also significantly reduced rural poverty (Burgess / Pande 2005). 
The “modernist” period 
While there are examples where market-replacing activism was successful, in most cases 
it was not and might even have impeded development. From the 1970s onwards it was 
increasingly accepted that two major assumptions of the market-replacing approach – that 
governments know how to replace markets and that they always seek to maximise social 
welfare – were flawed. A growing body of work found that public authorities in develop-
ing countries often had limited technical capacities for running financial institutions and 
that their willingness and capacity to govern financial institutions in a way that increases 
private investment depended on the interests of the political leadership (Brownbridge et al. 
1998). 
In response to these insights a consensus emerged in the 1980s that governments should 
withdraw from markets, including the financial sector. The costs of government failures 
were regarded as exceeding those of market failures and direct government interventions 
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were therefore seen as counterproductive. The new benchmark became the best-practice 
institutions of the industrialised economies and policies of this so-called “modernist” ap-
proach sought to transplant these institutions to the developing world (Honohan / Beck 
2007, 7-12).9 As a result developing countries around the world started liberalising and 
privatising their financial systems in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The evidence for the effectiveness of modernism has been mixed. By the end of the 1990s 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, like in other regions, had made significant progress in 
macroeconomic stability and bank restructuring, usually including the re-entry of foreign 
capital and the privatisation of banks (Beck et al. 2009, 14-15). Yet, in many African 
countries the institutional mechanisms needed to supervise and regulate banking in the 
modernist system were absent when reforms started so that the first decade of financial 
liberalisation was accompanied by macroeconomic instability, and liberalisation often had 
devastating effects on the real economy, as evident in growing disintermediation in the 
1980s and early 1990s.10 
The success in building inclusive financial systems with the modernist approach has fallen 
short of expectations: By the end of the 1990s access to finance in sub-Saharan Africa was 
still limited for those groups that were traditionally shut out of the market, such as lower 
income households or SMEs. The operations of the newly licensed domestic and foreign 
commercial banks’ have concentrated on government lending and international assets, 
avoiding lending to the domestic private sector and in particular to agriculture (Honohan / 
Beck 2007, 29-34; Chang 2009, 494-497) The experience has been similar in other world 
regions (Hanson 2003). In response to the overall disappointing record of both market-
replacing activist and modernist approaches, the debate has shifted again, back towards 
more government involvement, but this time emphasising the need for pro-market orienta-
tion (De la Torre et al. 2007; World Bank 2007, 145-146). 
 
                                                 
9 The approach has been referred to as “modernist” because policies under this heading aimed at govern-
ing financial markets in the same manner as industrialised countries, focusing for instance on improving 
the macroeconomic environment, contractual and information frameworks in order to increase access to 
large-scale finance for formal enterprises (see for instance Honohan / Beck 2007, 7-12; Beck et al. 
2009). Although the terms “activism” and “modernism” suggest a polarisation into two highly contrast-
ing and incompatible approaches to financial policymaking, in most countries in the developing and the 
developed world activist and modernist approaches to financial reform complement each other today. 
Moreover, as Honohan and Beck (2007, 12) point out “sometimes it is not immediately clear whether 
certain policies should best be considered modernist or activist.” This paper uses these terms as they 
have become important reference points in the debate on financial inclusion, analogue to the terms 
“structuralist/interventionist” and “neoliberal/laissez faire” in more general debates on the role of the 
state in the market. 
10 One of the most significant accounts is the case study of Nigeria by Lewis and Stein (1997). 
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Pro-Market Activism11 
Over the past decade a consensus has emerged that the role of government needs to go 
beyond ensuring macroeconomic stability, towards building the necessary institutions for 
an inclusive, efficient and stable financial system. This view is informed by a more recent 
body of literature which provides strong empirical evidence for the key role of institutions 
for economic development and the removal of market failures (Rodrik et al. 2004; 
Acemoglu et al. 2001). 
A major focus of public action has been on developing the contractual and informational 
framework. At the top of the agenda are collateral and bankruptcy law reforms which aim 
at protecting the rights of both borrowers and lenders in order to facilitate lending. Other 
major reforms aim at improving the court system or building alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms and establishing asset and collateral registries. Public action also focuses on 
strengthening independent bank regulation and supervision, including the formulation and 
implementation of accounting and disclosure standards. Such measures not only aim at 
increasing the stability, but also the degree of competition and innovation of the financial 
system, two key determinants of outreach. 
It also has become part of mainstream economic thinking that there is room for pro-
market-activism as carefully designed, market-friendly government interventions in the 
financial sector to address specific market failures “while the fruits of ongoing institu-
tional reform are still unripe” (De la Torre et al. 2007). In contrast to the earlier market-
replacing approach, pro-market activism is based on the assumption that markets can 
broaden access to finance and therefore the goal of government interventions is to develop 
or enable markets, not to replace them (Beck et al. 2009; De la Torre et al. 2007). To im-
prove the intermediation of financial resources into higher levels of investment, propo-
nents of pro-market activism recommend governments to use a combination of sticks, e.g. 
moral suasion, and carrots, such as tax incentives. Considerations of financial sustainabil-
ity have become central to the design of pro-market interventions (De la Torre et al. 2007). 
While it is acknowledged that government interventions might create inefficiencies in the 
short-term allocation of resources, the key underlying assumption is that time-bound pro-
market activist policies may increase long-term productivity. 
Pro-market activism can take the form of affirmative regulatory policy. One of the most 
prominent examples is the establishment of credit registries. Credit registries give access 
to clients’ credit history and increase the transparency of borrower quality, which makes it 
                                                 
11 De la Torre et al. (2007) introduced the term “pro-market activism” in the access debate, which has also 
been picked up by others (see for instance Beck et al. 2009; De Luna-Martinez 2006; Ize et al. 2008). De 
la Torre et al. (2007) describe this new approach in detail and many of the characteristics of activism 
presented in this paper are based on their concept. This paper adopts a broad definition of pro-market ac-
tivism because, as outlined at the beginning of the section, activism is defined more broadly as the “de-
liberate intervention to promote the outreach of financial services to groups of society which so far have 
been underserved”. The term “pro-market” is used to contrast the current view with the market-
replacing approach prevailing in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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safer for financial institutions to lend to new customers. They also allow borrowers to 
build reputational collateral which increases their bargaining power for the terms of credit. 
Banks are not always supportive of building credit registries, if doing so will entail the 
compulsory sharing of their information with other lenders which increases competition. 
In some countries the authorities have therefore started to push beyond what bankers are 
comfortable with. In Kenya, for instance, a private operator struggled for several years to 
initiate a credit registry due to the lack of interest among banks. The Kenyan Central Bank 
(CBK) took the initiative and issued a regulation which mandated financial institutions to 
share information with credit bureaus. Similar approaches were taken in Ghana and 
Uganda (Mylenko 2007). While these examples show that activism can be successful in 
addressing coordination failures and first mover disincentives, the fact that reforming or 
establishing credit registries stagnates in the majority of African countries (Beck et al. 
2009), indicates that both technical capacity and political will are important intervening 
variables in the success of pro-market activism. 
It is also increasingly acknowledged that activism might have to go beyond competition 
policy and first-best institution building. A case in point is the moral suasion exercised by 
South African authorities, causing banks to introduce the Mzansi (basic transaction) ac-
count in 2004. The Mzansi account is an entry-level deposit account offering lower 
charges and no overdraft facilities developed by the South African banking industry. To 
mitigate the financial risks of offering a low-cost account, participating banks shared the 
costs of product development and marketing. While the expectations of participating 
banks in terms of revenue (where breakeven was the expectation) were not met, they were 
exceeded with respect to take-up: By December 2008, more than six million Mzansi ac-
counts had been opened, about two-thirds of which by people who had never had a bank 
account before (Bankable Frontier Associates 2009). Yet, there are many examples where 
moral suasion has not worked. For instance, frustrated by the results of earlier attempts to 
induce the private sector to serve each district, in 2006 the government of Uganda man-
dated the establishment of savings and credit cooperatives to be supported by services 
supplied by the poorly managed government-owned Postal Savings Bank (Beck et al. 
2009, 20). The difficulties many African governments face in persuading banks to ensure 
the interoperability of payment system infrastructure which spurs competition, also indi-
cate the limitations of moral suasion. 
Another example for the promotion of market-friendly and activist financial governance is 
the key role that has recently been assigned to developing country central banks in the 
design and implementation of consumer protection policies.12 It is increasingly acknowl-
edged that this role might go beyond regulation and supervision to protect customers from 
potentially predatory behaviour of financial institutions: The CBK, for instance, provides 
an overview of bank charges to the public to facilitate comparing for customers (Candace / 
                                                 
12 Consumer protection has emerged as an important reform area complementary to the field of financial 
inclusion: Efforts to expand financial inclusion in developing countries have allowed many new cus-
tomers to access the formal banking system. Yet, these new customers often have no experience in using 
banking services and lack an understanding of financial products, so that they are more exposed to the 
risk of paying excessively high interest rates and bank charges, or becoming over-indebted. 
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Angela 2008, 6); similarly, the Peruvian central bank requires banks to disclose the “An-
nual Effective Cost Rate” which is expressed like an interest rate, but includes all costs 
associated with a consumer credit, such as evaluation charges or credit insurance premi-
ums (Alliance for Financial Inclusion 2010, 4). Moreover, cost information associated 
with financial services has to be published daily in newspapers. When this information 
was first published, interest rates dropped by as much as 15 percent in six months 
(Alliance for Financial Inclusion 2010, 3) However, as consumer protection has only re-
cently been added to the list of priorities on the financial reform agenda, there is a lack of 
experience with activist consumer protection, and it is too early to more broadly evaluate 
the capacity and willingness of governments to intervene in the area of consumer protec-
tion. 
Many governments continue using instruments which were common during market-
replacing activism. Examples are credit guarantee schemes or direct public finance. Evi-
dence of the effectiveness of these instruments in the past decade has – just like past ex-
perience – been mixed at best. In Chile, for instance, the government-owned Banco Estado 
has managed to broaden access to finance for micro-entrepreneurs through credit provi-
sion, while operating profitably (Benavente 2006). Benavente et al. (2006) show that the 
FOGAPE credit guarantee scheme funded by the Chilean government is also a success-
story. African examples for successful government interventions might include the South 
African public business finance agency Khula Enterprise Finance, which promotes SME 
lending (Sapp Mancini et al. 2008, 7) and the Tanzanian SME credit guarantee scheme 
established by the Bank of Tanzania in 2005, which involves 50-50 risk sharing. However, 
in most African countries, public banks have not adjusted their business models, govern-
ment schemes fail to recover loans and impose heavy fiscal costs without reaching their 
target groups (Honohan / Beck 2007, 99-102). So-called “smart subsidies”13 have not yet 
had the expected take-up. 
The examples show that it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of pro-market activism, 
partly because the policies have been adopted quite recently, partly because pro-market 
activism is a very broad and ill defined category. Yet, it is possible to draw a headline 
conclusion from existing experiences: There is, similarly as with regard to market-
replacing activism, a broad range of examples of both successful and unsuccessful pro-
market activist policies. 
Remarkably, both in the past and today, developing country governments around the 
world have been using similar activist policies. In most countries these interventions have 
not achieved their goals. Yet, the fact that some countries, primarily but not exclusively in 
East Asia, have had successful experiences and managed to design and use the instruments 
in an effective way, suggests that under certain conditions, differing from country to coun-
try, activism might be a successful strategy to substantially increase the financial resources 
                                                 
13 One example is the initiative by a public-private alliance for financial inclusion, Banco de las Oppor-
tunidades, in Colombia: In their model subsidies for banks which open agents in rural areas are auc-
tioned through a competitive process, with the winning bank receiving in the first year 100 percent of 
the subsidy, 50 percent in the second, and no subsidy in the third year.  
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available for productive investment. Table 1 provides a stylised summary of the different 
approaches to financial governance in the developing world over the past seven decades. 
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2.3 Politics as a key determinant of the effectiveness of activism 
The past experience suggests that activism is neither a generally harmful, nor necessarily 
effective approach. Rather, the evidence indicates that, in line with the welfare economic 
argument, activism has the potential to promote finance for development if the country-
specific environment is right. While a number of arguments could be made to explain the 
failure of government interventions in markets, such as explanations based on ideas or 
ideology (Krueger 1993), or on the lack of expertise to identify binding constraints 
(Hausmann et al. 2007), the more recent literature examining interventions in financial 
markets has identified politics and a lack of good governance as key determinants 
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2008; Honohan / Beck, 2007; Stiglitz / Uy 1996, 273). There is a 
strong consensus that activist policies, which entail giving discretionary powers to gov-
ernments, can easily be and have indeed been politically abused. 
This section seeks to illustrate this perspective which is more systematically developed in 
the next two sections. Contrasting African and East Asian experiences with market-
replacing activism illustrates what effect politics and the resulting governance structures 
can have on the design and implementation of activist policies – negative and positive, 
respectively. 
In many sub-Saharan African countries no attempt was made to set clear goals for gov-
ernment-owned banks, to measure their performance against these goals or to undertake 
cost-benefit analyses (Honohan / Beck 2007, 99-107). A major reason for this lack of ade-
quate governance structures seems to be that governments used the banking sector as a 
source of finance: In many cases, the practice to pay off political clients distorted the lend-
ing decisions of government-owned banks so that many of them ended up lending to the 
wealthy and politically connected. Often public banks were used to make up for the losses 
of inefficient public enterprises and central banks served to finance the state apparatus 
more generally (Brownbridge et al. 1998). The Uganda Central Bank, for instance, failed 
to adequately appraise or monitor loans or to pursue their recovery, because of the politi-
cal nature of lending: The discipline of borrowers was low because they often regarded 
such loans as rewards for political support and in some instances politicians also told their 
constituents that loans from government banks need not be repaid (Nsereko 1995, 28-29). 
As a consequence the loan recovery rates for the lending schemes administered by Ugan-
dan public banks were below 50 percent in the 1980s, and banks mostly failed to reach 
their targeted clientele (Brownbridge 1998a, 129-131). 
Moreover, in many African countries positions in development banks were used by public 
authorities to reward political clients. This may explain why the Nigeria Education Bank, 
a public institution to finance the higher education sector, had failed to make a single loan 
seven years after it was established, despite employing 261 staff in 21 offices (Alawode et 
al. 2000, 55). The political costs of layoffs of excess staff were a key obstacle to the priva-
tisation of government banks as part of the financial reform process. 
Private banks in Africa also failed to serve the real economy in a way that increased 
broad-based private investment, and provided financial resources mainly to the govern-
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ment and a small economic elite: Using political pressure, politicians and politically con-
nected private investors in some countries appear to have been able to access loans from 
private banks at below market rates, to fail to repay them and to resist repayment success-
fully when banks took action to recover the loans. Moreover, African governments, 
chronically in fiscal crisis, used not only direct measures such as lending requirements to 
public enterprises but also indirect measures such as interest rate controls or high reserve 
requirements to govern private banks so as to finance the state apparatus (Brownbridge et 
al. 1998; Daumont et al. 2004). 
At the same time, private banks, in principle opposed to such government interference in 
the banking sector, often came to a profitable modus vivendi with the government: In 
many African countries, such as Botswana, Kenya or Ghana private banks did not have to 
compete with state-owned financial institutions: The private and public banks often served 
different market segments, with public banks focusing on serving development priority 
sectors and public enterprises and private banks serving large enterprises; where private 
banks were required to follow sectoral credit policies, cooperation was usually bought 
with profitable quid pro quos such as central bank discounting of loans, access to inexpen-
sive funds from government placements or controls on deposit rates that gave banks a 
profitable spread (Haggard / Maxfield 1993, 301; Daumont et al. 2004, 43). 
The lack of adequate financial governance also had devastating costs for the technical ca-
pacities of both public and private banks: There were notable exceptions such as the 
Ethiopian government banks, the government-owned Kenyan Commercial Bank (KCB) or 
private banks in Botswana (Brownbridge et al. 1998). Yet, most African central banks 
lacked the necessary capacities for prudential regulation and supervision, because the fi-
nancial incentives of powerful political and economic agents determined financial policy-
making. Moreover, the politisation of lending decisions discouraged public and to a lesser 
extent private banks from building up capacities in liquidity, assets and risk management. 
In contrast, the literature on the East Asian Miracle emphasises how the political leader-
ship delegated authority to insulated economic bureaucracies (technocrats) so that they 
were able to develop efficient and growth enhancing economic policies.14 As in Africa, 
financial policymaking was motivated by political objectives to secure power, finance the 
state apparatus and ensure popular acceptance, and to this end governments heavily inter-
vened in the banking system. Yet, governance structures, incentive mechanisms and the 
efficiency of interventions differed substantially between Africa and the newly industrial-
ised East Asian countries. 
Nissanke (2001) describes the financial governance structure as a performance based sys-
tem for the distribution of rents: Policymakers sought to create rent opportunities (“con-
tingent rents”) through the same set of financial policies as in Africa, such as interest rate 
controls and entry regulations. The underlying assumption was in line with welfare eco-
nomic theory that in the absence of rent opportunities, banks would not have sufficient 
                                                 
14 For an account of the role of technocrats in economic policymaking, see Criscuolo and Palmade (2008), 
Winters (1996), specifically for finance see MacIntyre (1993) or Cheng (1993). 
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incentives to provide the socially efficient level of financial services to the private sector 
given the prevalence of market failures. Yet, in contrast to activist approaches in most 
African countries, the size of rents for banks was proportionate to their efforts in expand-
ing their business: Rents were performance-indexed opportunities. 
This governance structure appears to have created incentives for banks to expand their 
deposit base and improve their loan portfolio through more diligent monitoring: Unlike 
government-owned banks in many other developing economies, those in Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan, and arguably Indonesia seem to have behaved prudently and were mostly 
successful in reaching their target groups (Stiglitz / Uy 1996). East Asian policymakers 
took several measures to minimise problems of political capture (although they were not 
able to eliminate them) by powerful economic interests. Taiwan gave employees of public 
banks incentives to act prudently and penalised employees whose loans did not perform. 
Korea imposed strict performance criteria to guide banks' lending decisions. In order to 
insulate public banks from political pressure, public officials in Malaysia were not allowed 
to serve on the boards of public banks (Stiglitz / Uy 1996, 258-259). In contrast to most 
African countries, policymakers in Northeast Asia directed credit mainly to private enter-
prises and changed credit policies rapidly when policies were not functioning properly 
(Stiglitz / Uy 1996, 271-272). Thereby, banks were given incentives to develop close links 
with firms and relationship-based lending allowed banks to reduce the information costs 
related to financial intermediation and to adopt a long-term business perspective, which 
increased the provision of term loans. Through the close relationship between companies, 
banks and a supervising and risk-taking government, the credit risks were socialised, as 
were the social benefits from higher private investment at a later stage of economic devel-
opment (Nissanke 2001; Kang 2003). 
The Northeast Asian experience highlights the importance of the governance structure 
activist states choose for the allocation of financial resources. There are examples showing 
that activism can be a viable developmental strategy in Africa, such as the case of the Bot-
swana Development Corporation and of the KCB: Governments used these public banks 
to pursue their developmental agenda but made provisions that the banks were managed 
relatively efficiently with governments deliberately abstaining from interference in day-to-
day management and ensuring that the majority of board members were private entrepre-
neurs (Brownbridge et al. 1998, 20-21, 84-86). While most African governments seem to 
have lacked the political will or capacity to design adequate governance structures which 
monitor and evaluate the financial sustainability of programmes and the outreach to in-
tended beneficiaries, there is variation within sub-Saharan Africa in the degree of success 
in using activism as a tool to increase access to finance, depending on the political envi-
ronment in which financial policymaking takes place. 
Based on these experiences, the current consensus on the role of the state in the financial 
sector takes it as a basic premise that the political realities have to be taken into account in 
the design of activist policies (Beck et al. 2009; Honohan / Beck 2007, 12). While it is 
widely agreed that modernist approaches should be complemented through some form of 
activism to correct market failures and increase finance for private investment, African 
policymakers are often not recommended to take themselves the lead in implementing the 
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activist agenda by increasing their direct engagement in the provision of financial services 
(Honohan / Beck, 2007, 12). Rather, they are advised to smooth the way for private activ-
ists such as NGOs or social entrepreneurs. This view rests on the assumption that many 
African governments lack adequate governance structures (Honohan / Beck 2007, 6, 11, 
12; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2008, 143; World Bank 1997). As the stylised comparison be-
tween African and East Asian experiences with activism highlights, appropriate govern-
ance structures seem to be the major precondition for successful market interventions: 
Where activism was successful, policies tended to be closely monitored and characterised 
by provisions that seek to hinder the political capture of policies by a powerful economic 
elite and the exploitation of the financial sector as a source of government finance (De la 
Torre et al. 2007; Stiglitz / Uy 1996).  
3 Assessing the current approach towards activism 
The consensus on the role of government today is distinct from the predominant views in 
the previous periods of market-replacing activism or modernism, in that it sees govern-
ments’ main role in creating an enabling environment for financial markets. It is increas-
ingly acknowledged that sometimes this role might have to go beyond competition poli-
cies and first-best institution-building towards affirmative regulation and other more direct 
interventions, whereby good governance is regarded as a key determinant of the effective-
ness such policies (Honohan / Beck 2007, 12). For at least three reasons this view on ac-
tivism offers a realistic and promising way forward towards making finance work for Af-
rica. 
 First, the current consensus has the potential to spur on the development of inclusive 
financial systems, because it has overcome the dualism of states versus markets of the 
Washington Consensus and sees a role for the state in improving the functioning of the 
market. This insight is important because it acknowledges that market failures could 
make the provision of financial services to some groups of society prohibitively costly 
and that a modernist approach alone is not likely to broaden access to finance in the 
medium term. It also acknowledges that at a time of unprecedented concentration of 
capital in a small number of banks, uncoordinated, decentralised actions by civil soci-
ety, business associations for underserved sectors and social entrepreneurs are unlikely 
to result in substantially increased access to investment resources for SMEs or agricul-
ture, and that the state might play an important role in negotiating and implementing 
large-scale, collective solutions involving public and private actors. 
 Second, the current view on activism is promising because, informed by past experi-
ence, it recognises that, while globally acclaimed best-practice institutions might offer 
a first-best solution to market failures, transplanting them to Africa without taking into 
account the local political conditions is unlikely to work. There has emerged a consen-
sus that “no size fits all” and that building best-practice institutions in Africa takes 
time, so that in the meantime public action could try to find alternative second-best so-
lutions as transitional devices. This gives policymakers in countries at a lower stage of 
economic development more policy space. 
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 Third the current view on activism offers a promising way forward, because it has in-
corporated insights from research which identifies politics as a key explanatory vari-
able for the success and failure of activism.15 It is now widely accepted that the differ-
ences in the objectives and the functioning of institutions governing activist policies 
are due to political factors. At the core of this “institutional turn” and the renewed in-
terest in political economy are the propositions that states and markets are politically 
determined and that good governance is a precondition for the success of activist poli-
cies. The current approach to activism does not deny that other country-specific factors 
such as ideology or the ability to identify the binding constraints in an economy, de-
termine the effectiveness of interventions, but it is assumed that these concepts can 
explain only part of the cross-country variation in the effectiveness of activism and in-
teract significantly with politics. 
While the current consensus on activism provides a positive perspective on the role of 
government in financial markets, and offers a promising starting point for thinking about 
how to raise finance for investment in Africa, a major drawback remains: The associated 
policy implications are not quite clear. It is recognised that activism can work in principle, 
but it is not clear under what conditions governments are willing and capable to pursue 
activist policies successfully. When do political leaders choose a governance structure that 
on the one hand resists political capture by private interests, and on the other avoids public 
authorities using their political power in a way that merely benefits the state apparatus, 
politicians or their political supporters? It seems clear that without good governance con-
ceived in this way, government interventions will rarely be successful. Yet, although it has 
become part of mainstream economic thinking that it is necessary to “get the political 
conditions right” before any type of government intervention, assessing ex ante whether a 
state will demonstrate adequate governance is less straightforward. This makes it difficult 
for donors to direct their resources for the support of activist policies only to those gov-
ernments which are likely to implement them successfully. 
While there is a large body of literature on the welfare economics argument in favour of 
government interventions, there is little research which tries to contribute to a positive 
theory of activism, i.e. a concept which helps evaluate ex ante whether a state has the will-
ingness and capacity to pursue activist policies successfully. The small body of research in 
political economy which explores the determinants of financial policymaking has taken up 
this challenge, and allows moving closer towards such a concept of effective activism. 
Through its focus on endogenous policy choices, a political economy perspective would 
not only help to evaluate the chances for success of an activist approach, but could also 
inform policymaking in those countries which currently lack adequate governance to pur-
sue activist policies successfully. There is a high added value to country-level political 
economy research that explores the potential of activism, because it would allow prioritis-
ing avenues for reform and as a consequence offering more effective guidance for policy-
makers.  
                                                 
15 Influential works include Haggard et al. (1993), Brownbridge et al. (1998), Daumont et al. (2004), Nis-
sanke (2001), Fry (1994, 322) and Bhagwati (1982). 
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4 The potential of activism as a tool to increase finance for private 
investment – a political economy perspective 
Contrasting positive experiences with activism in Northeast Asia with the failures in many 
African countries highlights the influence of politics on the effectiveness of activist poli-
cies and the need to study the political environment in which financial policymaking takes 
place in order to be able to explain and predict the outcome of any government interven-
tion. 
This chapter sketches some starting points for thinking about a political economy frame-
work of activism, and demonstrates how such a framework could inform policymaking. 
Based on the existing literature on the political determinants of financial policymaking the 
chapter begins by discussing the major factors which could be used to weigh the empirical 
support for using activism as a tool to increase finance for private investment in a particu-
lar country. While the overall body of work on the politics of finance in developing coun-
tries is small and mainly focuses on middle-income countries in Latin America and East 
Asia, this literature provides a number of analytical cues on which future work on the po-
litical economy of financial reform in Africa could build on. The rest of this chapter draws 
some policy implications from the political perspective on financial policymaking by 
elaborating what reform strategies are possible in countries where the political environ-
ment is unfavourable to a successful implementation of government activism. 
4.1 Policy coalitions and the politics of finance in developing countries 
The most substantial body of work which seeks to explain variation in financial policy-
making from a political perspective has emerged in the fields of historical institutionalism 
and the political economy sub-field of fiscal economy.16 This work suggests that policy 
coalitions, defined as coalitions of interest cutting across state and society, play an impor-
tant role in shaping financial policy patterns: State and private sector actors form implicit 
or explicit alliances to lobby for desired policies. Other state actors and social groups may 
form alliances in opposition. The difference in strength of competing coalitions then 
shapes policy choices. This coalitional approach to explaining financial policy rests on 
three key underlying assumptions: 
- State-business relations are based on interdependence (Maxfield 1990; Moore / 
Schmitz 2008); 
- Financial interests shape behaviour (Maxfield 1990; Haggard et al. 1993; Haber et al. 
2008; Rajan / Zingales 2003); 
                                                 
16 Fiscal economy posits that the structures of complex organisations such as states, and the strategies of 
their managers, are influenced by the location of their resources (see for instance Goldsheid 1958). 
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- The translation of interests into policy is mediated by the historically evolved organi-
sation of the private sector and the revenue base of the state (Maxfield 1990; Winters 
1994; Boone 2005). 
The interdependence of the state and the private sector 
The proposition that state-business relations are based on interdependence is drawn from 
arguments about what has been termed the ‘structural power of capital’. In most develop-
ing countries there are tendencies for state predation and political capture, but also incen-
tives for cooperation: To take the risk of investing the private sector needs the active sup-
port of the state to provide physical, social and legal infrastructure. States in turn depend 
structurally on private investors for two main reasons, which form the basis of the ‘struc-
tural power of capital’: First, the state apparatus depends on the inflow of financial re-
sources to fulfil its functions and private capital providing tax income, party donations, or, 
in the case of banks, credit is often the primary source for this. Second, politicians need 
private capital to invest within their jurisdictions in order to maintain a minimum level of 
economic prosperity, which ensures the government popular acceptance and increases the 
chances of continuing in power (Moore / Schmitz 2008; Bates / Lien 1985; Winters 1996).  
Private banks seem to have a privileged position among investors, not only because of 
their ability to withhold financial resources from government, but because they shape in-
dustrial and agricultural growth and hence macroeconomic performance more generally 
through channelling resources to the real economy (Thurow 1989; Zysman 1983). The 
structural dependence of governments on private actors, and in particular on private banks, 
is likely to increase their leverage over financial policy. Therefore the assumption of inter-
dependence between the state and the private sector should serve as a starting point for 
thinking about the actors involved and the influence of different policy coalitions to shape 
financial policy. 
Financial interests as determinants of behaviour 
The second proposition, that financial interests shape behaviour, is a key contention un-
derlying all major political economy approaches to explain financial policy. Common in-
terests between sections of the public and the private sector form the foundation of differ-
ent policy coalitions. Related to the first assumption of state-business interdependence, 
this suggests that explaining reform trajectories requires an analysis of the financial inter-
ests of actors in the public and private sphere, such as private banks, business associations, 
central banks and (bureaucrats within) ministries of finance.  
Two issues deserve particular attention: First, the financial interests of private banks with 
respect to financial reforms seem to be particularly important, because bankers tend to 
have leverage over policy, as both the government and the productive sector rely on exter-
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nal bank financing.17 Second, in analysing the financial interests of ‘the state’, states 
should not be conceived of as monoliths, as there might be intra-state variations in finan-
cial interests, and as a result in the demonstrated willingness to pursue particular reform 
strategies (Maxfield 1990). For instance, it seems likely that the interests of central banks 
in their role as monetary authorities with a focus on financial system stability, differ from 
those of ministries of industry or ministries of economic development. As a result, central 
banks might seek to establish coalitions with different partners in the private sector than 
the ministries would. 
The translation of interests into policy 
The existing literature with a coalitional approach to explaining financial policy highlights 
two factors which mediate the translation of financial interests into policy: 
- First, the historically determined organisation of the private sector (in particular of the 
banking sector) vis-à-vis the government, as reflected in the private sector diversity 
and autonomy vis-à-vis the state (Maxfield 1994; Boone 2005; Haggard / Maxfield 
1993); 
- Second, the revenue base of the state, as registered in the degree of reliance on the 
domestic private sector and on external sources of revenue (such as foreign capital 
markets, aid or exports of natural resources) for government income (Winters 1994; 
Winters 1996; Maxfield 1990; Rajan / Zingales 2003). 
These two factors influence financial policymaking through their effect on the nature (who 
becomes part of a particular policy coalition) and the power (which of the competing pol-
icy coalitions are favoured in a policy process) of particular policy coalitions. 
Among the most significant works exploring how the organisation of the private sector 
affects financial policymaking is Boone’s State, Capital and the Politics of Banking Re-
form in Sub-Saharan Africa (2005). Boone (2005, 401) argues that differences in banking 
reform patterns reflect “cross-national differences in the strength, diversity and autonomy 
of private capital vis-à-vis the state.” She demonstrates that the process of banking reform 
is determined by historically produced state-private sector relationships, so that reform 
outcomes are to a significant degree path-dependent: Government responses to pressures 
for financial reform in the 1980s and 1990s were conditioned by pre-existing patterns of 
state-society interaction, as registered in the concentration and ownership structure of the 
banking sector and in political alliances between the state and the banking sector. The 
stronger, more diverse and more autonomous the private banking sector was vis-à-vis the 
government, the further and deeper went the process of reform. Boone’s findings are in 
line with other works on the determinants of economic policymaking in the developing 
world. Bräutigam et al. (2002), for instance, examine the emergence of growth coalitions 
                                                 
17 This argument is also at the core of resource dependency theory, a sociological theory of organisational 
behaviour which suggests that the external resource needs of organisations and how and by whom they 
can be filled helps to explain organisational behaviour (Pfeffer / Salancik 1978). 
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in Africa, and find that in countries where the private sector is weakly developed, it does 
not constitute a powerful partner in economic reform processes and government policies 
are less successful in economic restructuring. There is also evidence that in developing 
countries with highly concentrated, oligopolistic banking sectors, financial reforms are not 
as far-reaching, maintaining the privileges of banks, because governments try to preserve 
the political alliances established with these banks in pre-reform periods (Haggard et al. 
1993; Boone 2005). 
In light of these findings on the role of the organisation of the private sector, it seems 
plausible that activist policies are more likely to succeed in African countries where the 
state is complemented by a diverse and autonomous private (banking) sector. There are at 
least two reasons for this: First, governments find it more difficult to exploit the private 
banking sector as a source of finance for government entities, patronage or elections when 
it is stronger and more autonomous. Governments also have fewer incentives to do so if a 
developed private sector provides stable and substantial tax revenues. Second, the political 
capture of activist policies by powerful economic interests is less likely when the banking 
system is diverse and competitive. Thus, the structure of the banking sector might at least 
partly explain why activist policies in Kenya, which has a vibrant and competitive private 
banking sector, have been more successful than in Uganda, where the banking sector is 
still shallow, or Nigeria, where banking has only recently started to become more competi-
tive. 
However, while the analysis of historically determined state-private sector relationships 
carries substantial weight in explaining or predicting long-term policy patterns, it seems 
less suited to explain policy change: In a model where the power of different policy coali-
tions is entirely determined by internal, historically produced and thus relatively static 
institutional structures, policy is path-dependent. This makes it difficult to account for 
genuine financial reform and institutional innovation. Previous research on the politics of 
finance suggests that policy change is determined by external financial linkages, pointing 
to the importance of the state’s revenue base: Large and relatively stable inflows of finan-
cial resources from external sources (for instance through international capital markets, 
exports of natural resources or, arguably, foreign aid) make the government more inde-
pendent from the domestic private sector and reduce the need to seek private sector sup-
port for particular policies (Lukauskas / Minushkin 2000; Haggard et al. 1993; Moore / 
Schmitz 2008, 36-41).18 Activist, business-friendly policies seem therefore more likely to 
be successful when governments rely substantially on the domestic private sector as a 
source of government income and economic prosperity, than in a context where govern-
ments rely primarily on alternative sources of revenue (Lewis / Stein 1997; Brownbridge 
1998b; Winters 1996). 
However, this is not to suggest that access to external financial revenues has adverse ef-
fects in all circumstances: It seems plausible that in a context of a concentrated and 
autonomous private sector, access to revenues from external sources (such as foreign 
                                                 
18 This argument can also be found in the growing body of work on the effects of oil and aid on govern-
ance on the one hand and of tax revenue on the other hand (Bräutigam et al. 2008). 
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credit, income from natural resources or aid) reduces the vulnerability of governments to 
pressures from incumbent private firms, and this might increase the policy space for gov-
ernments and reduce the likelihood of the political capture of activist policies (Maxfield 
1994, 587; Rajan / Zingales 2003; Moore / Schmitz 2008, 37). 
This discussion of the coalitional approach to explaining or predicting policy choices sug-
gests that a framework to weigh the empirical support for using activism as a tool to in-
crease access to finance for productive private investment should usefully take into ac-
count the role of the historically determined organisational structure of relevant private 
sector institutions and the revenue base of the state. Both factors have important impacts 
on the structural dependence of governments on domestic capital, and on where authority 
resides within the government (Winters 1994).19 As a result, both factors influence gov-
ernment discretion over policy making and determine which particular public sector enti-
ties gain the upper hand in the process of policymaking, as well as whether the domestic 
private sector (and which sections) constitutes a powerful ally in the design of activist 
policies. The added value of developing a coalitional approach to understanding financial 
policy choices is likely to be high, as few researchers have taken up this challenge 
(Maxfield 1990; Lukauskas / Minushkin 2000; Boone 2005). 
4.2 Alternative approaches to explaining or predicting financial policy choices 
The coalitional approach, which builds on historical institutionalist and fiscal economy 
literature to explain or predict financial policymaking, differs significantly from state- or 
society-centred explanations as major alternative approaches in the literature on the politi-
cal economy of finance. 
Society-centred approaches  
Society-centred approaches perceive policy as the outcome of struggles among societal 
interest groups such as sectors or classes (Frieden 1991; Pagano / Volpin 2001; Rajan / 
Zingales 2003): Policy is conceived as an exchange where politicians provide policies 
favourable to those interested constituencies that their power depends on. In this analysis 
state interests and the state’s capacity to implement policies are conceived as perfectly 
flexible in responding to societal preferences.  
The major shortcoming of society-centred approaches is their vision of the state: The state 
is treated as a “black box” where the economic bureaucracy is essentially just reacting to 
private demands. This denies states an independent role as agenda setters proactively seek-
ing to create alliances to gain support for their preferred policies. Successful examples of 
activism such as the introduction of the Mzansi account in South Africa as a result of 
moral suasion, or mandatory information sharing with the credit bureau in Uganda are 
                                                 
19 For an account of how the organisation of the private sector and the revenue base of the state determine 
central bank independence, and hence financial policy patterns in developing countries, see Maxfield 
(1994). 
Florence Dafe 
26 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
difficult to explain with society-centred approaches. Moreover, society-centred analyses of 
activism neglect the role of state capacity as a precondition for effective government ac-
tion: The translation of private sector preferences into policy choices is particularly prob-
lematic in poor countries, not only because states might lack the political will, but also 
because they might not have the organisational, financial or knowledge resources to im-
plement the preferred policies of private sector groups effectively (Evans et al. 1985; Tho-
mas / Grindle 1990; Skocpol 1985; Winters 1996). 
State-centred explanations: The political institutions view 
In the realm of finance, state-centred explanations for financial policy choices predomi-
nantly focus on the role of political institutions for checks and balances such as electoral 
democracy (Haber et al. 2008; Girma / Shortland 2008; Huang 2010). The key underlying 
assumption of this so called political institutions view is that without self-enforcing politi-
cal institutions that limit government discretion, governments, relying on banks to provide 
them with a source of finance, have “strong incentives to govern the financial system so as 
to facilitate its own political survival at the expense of the development of a banking sys-
tem that can finance the private economy” (Haber et al. 2008, 2). 
The major shortcoming of this approach is that it does not consider the possibility that the 
revenue imperative (the necessity of governments to generate income) might also provide 
incentives for governments to introduce universal business-friendly policies to increase 
tax income (Winters 1996; Moore / Schmitz 2008; Tilly 1992). Governing finance might 
consist of more than financing government and the relationships between those controlling 
capital and those with political power are characterised by both conflict and cooperation. 
The assumption of causality running from political institutions to financial policy choices 
also appears to be problematic. One reason for this is the endogeneity of institutions. An 
explanation of policy choices based on institutions automatically raises the question why 
some states have democratic institutions and govern their financial sector well but others 
do not. While it seems plausible that in the long-run political institutions have the pre-
sumed positive effect, it is likely that, particularly in the short-run, there are other factors 
at work which determine both financial reform processes and the transition to democracy. 
The increasing empirical evidence that democracy has not always had the expected posi-
tive effect on economic development and reform in the developing world also suggests 
that a broader set of variables than those related to political institutions might be needed to 
explain or predict financial development and policy patterns (see for instance Bräutigam et 
al. 2002; Collier / Rohner 2008). As highlighted by the previous chapters, historically 
those developing countries which were most successful in intervening in financial mar-
kets, such as Korea or Taiwan, were not electoral democracies (Stiglitz / Uy 1996; Kang 
2003), and there is also quantitative evidence that electoral competition alone does not 
cause financial development (Keefer 2007; Rajan / Zingales 2003).20 
                                                 
20 There are at least two reasons why electoral democracies might not necessarily have more inclusive 
financial systems. First, while the majority of voters in many developing countries are currently ex-
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In light of the shortcomings of state-centred and society-centred explanations for financial 
policy choices, the added value of elaborating a framework to weigh the empirical support 
for activism using a coalitional approach to explain or predict financial policy is likely to 
be high. 
Few researchers have taken up this challenge and they mostly focused on Latin American 
and East Asian middle income countries (Maxfield 1990; Lukauskas / Minushkin 2000). 
Table 2 provides an overview of approaches in the existing literature to study financial 
policy patterns. The review of society-centred, state-centred and interdependence ap-
proaches provides some guidance for building a framework to study the potential of activ-
ism as a tool to increase access to finance. The next section will further elaborate the key 
elements and steps in a political economy analysis to weigh the empirical support for an 
activist approach. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
cluded from financial services, financial policymaking does not necessarily reflect their preferences, be-
cause finance might be a topic that is removed from the sphere of political competition: Usually differ-
ent parts of the state apparatus seek to fulfil the different and conflicting functions of the state. Some 
state organisations play leading roles within the clientelist spheres and cater to the electoral needs of the 
ruling parties, serving the majority of poor voters; others are more removed from political competition, 
as is often the case with central banks (Woodall 1996). If monetary agencies are removed from the po-
litical sphere, they are likely to prefer policies focusing on macroeconomic stability, as compared to 
policies seeking to increase the inclusiveness of financial systems (Haggard / Maxfield 1993). This also 
highlights that states should not be regarded as unitary actors and that there are intra-state variations in 
the capacity and willingness to pursue particular policies. Second, the link between democracy and fi-
nancial inclusion is problematic because in poor countries the institutional prerequisites for the effective 
representation of the preferences of financially excluded groups are often missing: Excluded groups 
such as the SME sector and its employees are often weakly organised along institutional lines (Bräuti-
gam et al. 2002), and “in patrimonial or personalistic regimes the potential numerical power of the votes 
of the poor is neutralised by their fragmentation among competing particularistic networks and inter-
ests” (Moore et al. 2003, 187), such as ethnic networks. 
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4.3 Summary: Starting points for an analytical framework to study the 
potential of activism as a tool to increase finance for private investment in 
Africa 
Existing research on the political economy of finance highlights the need to systematically 
explore how the interests of different groups translate into financial policy outcomes, in 
order to weigh the empirical support for activism as a tool to increase finance for private 
investment in a particular country. The review of the literature highlights two sets of fac-
tors as potential determinants of financial policy choices and of the nature of the policy 
coalitions that shape them, namely  
1. organisational factors, in particular 
- the autonomy of the private sector (in particular of banks) vis-à-vis the government: 
The more autonomous the private sector is vis-à-vis the government, the higher is the 
state’s structural dependence on it, and the more likely is it that the private sector con-
stitutes a powerful ally in the process of financial policymaking (Bräutigam et al. 
2002; Boone 2005). As a result policy coalitions across the public-private divide that 
seek to reform the financial sector in a way that sustainably increases access to finance 
are more likely, which plausibly has a positive effect on the design and effectiveness 
of activist policies. 
- the degree of concentration in the private sector (in particular in the banking sector): 
Concentration in the private sector – whether within the financial sector, among fa-
voured borrowers or as reflected in financial-industrial conglomerates – increases the 
power of the concentrated segment vis-à-vis the government (Haggard et al. 1993). 
Therefore the political capture of activist policies by powerful economic interests 
seems more likely in countries where the private (banking) sector is concentrated. Cor-
respondingly it seems plausible that activist policies are more likely to succeed in 
countries where states are complemented by a diverse and competitive private (bank-
ing) sector. A prime example constitutes the case of Chile, where the banking sector 
has become more diverse and competitive in recent years: There is evidence that pri-
vate commercial banks, forced to reach out to new customers, tend to support activist 
policies which help them to serve SMEs and that pro-market activism has become 
relatively effective (De la Torre et al. 2007; De la Torre et al. 2010). However, in the 
extreme case of a fragmented private sector, activist policies are less likely to work: 
Fragmentation constitutes an obstacle to collective action, so that governments would 
have difficulties to engage with the private sector in policymaking. 
2. the revenue base of the state. When governments have access to other sources of reve-
nue than domestic bank finance or taxes from domestic private sector activity through 
international linkages, such as credit from international capital markets or, as is more 
often the case in African countries, aid and exports of natural resources, governments 
are less structurally dependent on the domestic private sector (Winters 1996, 41; 
Moore / Schmitz 2008; Maxfield 1990; Boone 2005; Gordon / Li 2009). Thus, in a 
situation where the degree of reliance on the domestic private sector as a source of 
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government income and economic prosperity is low, incentives to cooperate with the 
domestic private (banking) sector to promote business-friendly and activist financial 
policies are also likely to be low. However the effects of government income from 
sources other than the domestic private sector are not adverse in all circumstances, be-
cause these alternative revenue sources can give governments a degree of autonomy 
from the domestic private (banking) sector which can also be used wisely. This could 
particularly be the case if conditions are attached to the use of the external revenues, as 
in the case of aid or in the context of a strong private sector (Maxfield 1994; Winters 
1994; Maxfield 1990). 
Future research on the potential of activism as a development strategy could also provide a 
high added value by considering the role of state capacity: Technical capacity (including 
adequate organisational and managerial resources) emerges as an important intervening 
variable in assessing the potential of pro-market activism as a tool to increase access to 
finance, in particular as pro-market activist strategies often require a commitment to sus-
tainable financial inclusion from multiple actors and effective coordination between them. 
Technical capacity seems a particularly important factor in the African context: While 
private sector development has increased the political clout of the private sector in finan-
cial policymaking in most African countries, there is a continued variation in the success 
of ongoing financial reform efforts across countries. Some states reform relatively eagerly, 
others fail to respond to the pressures from both private bankers to improve the investment 
climate and from donors and financially excluded businesses to make the financial sector 
more development-oriented. This suggests that technical capacity is a major mediating 
factor in explaining and predicting successful activism or policy choice more generally. 
Figure 1 summarises the ideas presented in this chapter in an analytical framework indi-
cating key issues in the different arenas of the political economy analysis. Future research 
could analyse these arenas in the proposed sequence, while it might be useful to revisit, 
reassess and reinterpret earlier information during the research process. 
The framework also takes into account two more general issues: First, that history plays an 
important role in policy choice through its effect on the organisational structure of the pri-
vate economy as well as on the financial incentives of various private and public agents. 
Second, that the state varies, and there are intra-state variations in state capacity.21 
 
                                                 
21 The phenomenon of “pockets of efficiency” illustrates that states vary, and that different state agencies 
have, different interests and capacities, based on their political and economic support base. There is 
strong empirical evidence that even in countries with poor governance and weak public sectors, reform-
oriented and well-functioning government entities do exist (Leonard 2008). In recent years the Central 
Bank of Nigeria seems to have emerged as such a pocket: Compared to other developing countries, Ni-
geria ranks low in governance indicators such as corruption, rule of law or government effectiveness 
(Kaufmann et al. 2009). Yet, despite a weak overall institutional environment and government capacity, 
the Central Bank of Nigeria emerged as one of the most eager reformers in sub-Saharan Africa, as indi-
cated by the politically difficult consolidation of the banking sector in 2004/2005, corporate governance 
reforms in the banking sector in 2006 and 2009 or the ambitious Financial Sector Strategy 2020. 
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Figure 1: Analytical Framework to study the potential of activism as a development strategy 
 
Arena 2: Basic country analysis  
Key issues for the analysis Selection of guiding questions 
Economic structure:  
economic development, pri-
vate sector development, 
revenue base of the state 
What is the level of economic and private sector development 
(including technical skills base, autonomy from government)? 
What is the organisational structure of the private sector? 
What are the main sources of government income? To what  
extent is the government dependent on private sector taxation? 
How do these structural factors affect the composition and  
influence of key actors in the financial sector? 
Financial sector development What have been the main policy trajectories within the sector? 
How have sector roles changed over time, and why? What have 
been the consequences for policymaking and implementation? 
Government capacity Does government exercise authority over bureaucracy, military, 
raising public revenue and policymaking? 
Development of (political) 
institutions  
How well institutionalised are the government apparatus, policy-
making processes and political parties?  
 
Arena 3: Analysis of key organisational players in the financial sector 
Key issues for the analysis Selection of guiding questions 
Roles and mandates Official and unofficial roles and mandate of the organisation 
Organisational structure Structure; balance of power across the organisation 
Management and leadership  Key actors; degree to which power is vested in individuals  
Financing Financial balance; sustainability of budget; degree of self-
financing; effect of funding source on policy preferences 
Incentives and motivation Opportunities for career advancement; level and distribution of 
remuneration; benefits and losses from changes of incentives 
Capacity Skills and resources; adequacy of information base; power of the 
organisation to define and implement policy 
How do historical legacies affect: roles, mandates; organisational structure; management, leader-
ship; financing; incentives and motivation; capacity 
 
Arena 4: Key issues for the analysis of the relationship between key players 
Historical foundation of relationships; power balance in relationships; how and why relation-
ships have changed over time;  effect of alliances on policy preferences and policy processes; 
impediments to and niches for collaboration across organisations and the public-private divide  
Arena 1: Defining the financial sector 
Key issues for the analysis Selection of guiding questions 
Mapping key players in the 
sector (e.g. ministries, central 
bank, bankers’ associations) 
What are the roles of the different actors in the financial sector? 
How much influence do different actors have in government and 
what is the historical basis for the differences?  
Source: Adapted from Moncrieffe / Luttrell (2005) and Moore (2001) 
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While it should not be seen as an inventory, this preliminary framework offers some start-
ing points for thinking about which elements might be important to consider in an analysis 
of the potential of activism as a tool to increase finance for development in a particular 
country. The framework could also more generally inform research which seeks to explore 
the political economy in developing countries, faced with the task of governing finance in 
a way that supports national development and, at the same time, to respond to pressures 
from international markets to limit the role of the state in financial markets. 
4.4 Implications of the approach 
Supporting an activist strategy, that is deliberate government interventions in the financial 
sector to promote the outreach of financial services to segments of the private sector 
which have been underserved, requires an understanding of the political environment, par-
ticularly of the financial interests and of the political clout of key actors. If the political 
conditions suggest that government entities have good enough governance to pursue activ-
ist policies effectively then there are, in line with welfare economic theory, convincing 
arguments for development practitioners to support well designed, time-bound activist 
policies to complement modernist approaches. 
But what if the political economy analysis suggests that the preconditions are not in place 
and governments are not likely to pursue activist policies successfully? The political 
economy framework drawn up in the last chapter emphasises that policy choices are at 
least to some extent outcomes of the historical development path of a country. These his-
torical foundations do not lend themselves to simple policy proposals because they sug-
gest that there is some element of path-dependency in policymaking. However, taking the 
political economy framework as a starting point it is possible to propose strategies for eco-
nomic change in the short and longer term, and to also draw policy implications for Afri-
can countries with a political environment unfavourable to activism. The political econ-
omy perspective suggests that policymakers and advisors in these countries seeking to 
promote access to finance need to pursue alternative strategies. In countries where activ-
ism is unlikely to work effectively, there are two main strategies to align the interests and 
incentives of the political and economic elites with those of the wider society: The first is 
to change the power balance in society to expand the space for reform policies, the second 
is to work within this power balance. 
4.4.1 Changing the power relationships within society  
If the political economy analysis suggests that the political environment is not favourable 
to effective activist policymaking, then one of the two main options is to implement poli-
cies that focus on changing the balance of power in society in a direction that is more con-
ducive to inclusive financial systems. Such a strategy is clearly a complex, mid- to long-
term and politically sensitive task. However, some donors, in concert with reform-oriented 
domestic constituencies and eventually the diaspora, are already implementing strategies 
for strengthening the political power of those groups with an interest in a greater and more 
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sustainable outreach of financial services, such as SMEs or social entrepreneurs providing 
financial services, and there have been important achievements in this respect. 
There is a large body of work (Wittman 1989; Przeworski 2000), which argues that one 
potential way to change the power balance within society, is to change the political institu-
tions and to try to induce greater political competition as this would stimulate more so-
cially efficient policies. This is also in line with the political institutions view of financial 
sector development, which explains the cross-country variation in financial development 
by variation in the degree of access to political institutions (Haber et al. 2008). However, 
as outlined in previous chapters, democracy has been a poor predictor for successful activ-
ism in the developing world. Political power to influence financial policymaking seems to 
derive less from the formal institution of electoral democracy, but rather from the control 
over economic resources and the ability of a group to organise itself into a political force.  
This suggests that public development strategies in these countries should have two major 
goals: Supporting those with an interest in inclusive and sustainable financial systems, 
such as small manufacturers, farmers or even banks seeking to reach out to SMEs, to gain 
economic weight and help them to organise themselves along interest lines. Middle and 
lower income groups as well as smaller entrepreneurs are often fragmented, because they 
lack the resources to organise themselves into a viable political force. For this reason, 
policies to strengthen political organisation should focus on encouraging what political 
economists call political entrepreneurship. A political entrepreneur, which could be an 
individual, such as a reform-oriented minister, or an organisation, such as a manufacturers 
association, a political party or, under certain conditions, even a venture capital fund, 
helps those who lack resources and have difficulties in forming a group to organise them-
selves into a political force. Political entrepreneurs do so through collecting and dissemi-
nating information, subsidising the costs of organisation and thereby facilitating collective 
action (Noll 1989; Kosack 2009). In many poor African countries, donors are the single 
most important political entrepreneurs: Through financial and technical assistance, they 
seek to strengthen the political and technical capacity of business membership organisa-
tions or of financial institutions targeting the lower end of the spectrum, such as microfi-
nance banks. This contributes to improving the enabling environment for government-
private sector relations. In the long term these efforts might strengthen the consumers of 
financial services, financial service providers interested in serving SMEs and public enti-
ties which promote access to finance, thus making the financial system more diverse and 
inclusive. As long as the private sector does not constitute a partner and challenger to the 
state, governments are unlikely to be responsive to the needs of those affected by their 
policies (Bräutigam et al. 2002). 
While there are many examples where political entrepreneurship had positive effects, it is 
less clear how to encourage it on the ground. It will be up to further research to shed more 
light on this issue. Although democracy is not a sufficient precondition for group forma-
tion, democracy may be helpful to encourage political entrepreneurship, as certain aspects 
of it make political entrepreneurship easier, such as freedom of both speech and associa-
tion. 
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4.4.2 Working within the existing power relationships of society 
An alternative to shifting the political power relationships would be to try to work within 
them. The challenge here is to design policies which have the potential to increase access 
to finance for productive investment in weak institutional environments, but are also in-
centive-compatible for those with economic and political power. 
In some parts of the financial development debate today, modernist policies are regarded 
as the preferred solution for reforming financial systems in societies where the political 
environment suggests that activist policies are unlikely to succeed. Seeing only a limited 
role for governments in financial markets, this approach posits that governments should 
focus on policies strengthening macroeconomic stability and the market-based provision 
of financial services through large-scale finance: Ensuring that banks can safely lend on 
financial resources, enabling companies in the formal sector to find the mix of equity and 
debt finance they need to grow, as well as implementing sophisticated tools for risk man-
agement, rank high on the agenda of modernists (Honohan / Beck 2007, 9). The guiding 
principle is to imitate the best practices of the advanced economies in developing coun-
tries. 
However, past experience demonstrates that the potential for building inclusive financial 
systems by solely following the modernist approach is limited. In Botswana, for instance, 
which has primarily followed a modernist approach since independence, there still are 
large gaps in access to finance for the middle market, lower income groups, agriculture 
and industries depending on long-term finance (Jefferis 2007; Harvey 1998; Boone, 2005). 
The experience in other sub-Saharan African countries is similar and the increase in out-
reach during the modernist period has also fallen short of expectations (Beck et al. 2009; 
Nissanke 2001): African financial markets have remained highly fragmented with little 
effective linkages and competition between market segments so that the majority of the 
population is still outside the formal banking system, served only by microfinance institu-
tions or informal arrangements. 
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that a modernist approach also raises political econ-
omy problems and that inadequate governance structures can undermine modernist poli-
cies, as indicated by the problems of political capture in privatisation processes or revi-
sions of capital adequacy requirements (Haggard / Lee 1993, 13-15; Brownbridge et al. 
1998; Lewis / Stein 1997). 
For these reasons, it is now widely acknowledged that it is even in countries with an unfa-
vourable political environment necessary to complement modernist approaches with de-
liberate interventions to broaden access to finance, although the focus might shift away 
from government-led solutions (Honohan / Beck 2007, see in particular pages 7-12). Such 
interventions could be designed by groups which are removed from internal political pres-
sure, e.g. donors or regional institutions, such as regional development banks. 
However, what are the options for African policymakers trying to work within unfavour-
able political environments? 
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 First, they could try to find ways of supporting the activist agenda of non-state actors, 
such as social entrepreneurs, which are incentive-compatible for those actors in power. 
 Second, it follows from the political economy analysis that policymakers and devel-
opment practitioners should create a stable revenue base: It seems plausible that gov-
ernments in fiscal crisis, lacking stable sources of revenue to finance public expendi-
ture are less likely to govern the financial sector in a way that contributes to broad-
based private investment, given the incentive to use the financial sector as a source of 
finance for government. 
 Third, and more generally, policymakers should incorporate the insights from research 
that policies which not only target the poorest and least powerful groups, but also in-
clude the middle-market, are more likely to succeed: Defining a broad access agenda 
that includes middle-sized enterprises that also lack access to investment resources, 
helps to mobilise powerful supporters (Rajan 2006). 
 Finally, more recent research on the political economy of reform suggests that improv-
ing existing or even establishing new second-best institutions could be a promising 
way forward in countries with an unfavourable political environment (Rodrik 2008). 
This body of literature challenges the notion that all developing countries should focus 
on building up the best-practice (or first-best) institutions prevailing in rich countries, 
such as efficient courts, private property rights or bankruptcy laws. The key assump-
tion is that the kind of institutions reformers should build should be contingent on the 
economic constraints and political realities of a specific country at a particular stage of 
development (Gerschenkron 1962; Rodrik 2008; Adler et al. 2009). Given that devel-
oping countries face different constraints and different political environments than rich 
countries, this may require the adoption of more fitting second-best institutions, which 
differ from those prevailing in rich countries, as a transitional device. Second-best in-
stitutions might offer a more pragmatic way forward, because they fit better with the 
economic and political realities in developing countries in the short term. In light of 
the difficulties African states face in implementing best-practice institutions, exploring 
the potential of second-best institutions such as relationship-lending, as opposed to 
rules-based lending, seems highly policy-relevant (Biggs / Shah 2006). Given the po-
tential social costs of the provision of credit within exclusive, relationship-based credit 
networks, it remains an important question for researchers under what conditions sec-
ond-best institutions can help building more inclusive financial systems in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
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Figure 2: Implications of the political economy framework 
Strategies for Reform 
Does the analysis suggest that the political-economic environment  
is favourable to activism? 
 
 
 Yes   No 
Consider activism as  
complementary, time-bound 
tool in financial reform 
 
   Change Work within existing 
   power relationships power relationships 
   within society e.g. e.g. improve second- 
   through political best institutions such  
   entrepreneurship as relationship-lending 
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5 Conclusion 
There is strong empirical evidence that access to finance for private investment is essential 
for enterprise development and economic growth. However, financial systems in sub-
Saharan Africa have remained highly exclusive. This is primarily the result of market fail-
ures which make the provision of financial services to lower income groups and SMEs 
prohibitively costly or, due to an uncompetitive market environment, unattractive. While 
market failures provide an argument for activism (defined as deliberate government inter-
ventions to promote access to finance), the experience with activism has been mixed at 
best. However, even though activism does not guarantee an increase in broad-based pro-
ductive private investment, past experience, both in the developing and the developed 
world, suggests that achieving this goal without deliberate government interventions is 
difficult, if not impossible.22 For this reason there is a renewed interest among develop-
ment practitioners in the question, under what conditions activist government interven-
tions in financial markets could serve as a tool to increase access to finance for productive 
investments. 
It is now commonly acknowledged that the effectiveness of activism depends on politics 
and there is a consensus that good governance is a precondition for government interven-
tions to be successful. This paper argues that while the current consensus on the potential 
of activism is a promising way forward, its policy implications are not quite clear: There is 
no fully developed positive approach of government activism and thus no framework 
which helps evaluating ex ante, whether a government entity is likely to successfully as-
sume an activist role. Without such ex ante predictors development practitioners will find 
it difficult to prioritise reform policies and define the adequate role for government in a 
particular country, ranging from a modernist to a pro-market activist role. Moreover, 
without such a framework there is the risk of spending resources on policies that seek to 
increase financial access, which are not likely to succeed and are unsustainable, spreading 
disenchantment with aid and leaving African countries without the financial services they 
urgently need. 
This paper shows that political economy can provide a framework which helps to assess 
whether government interventions in a particular country have a chance to succeed: 
Through the focus on endogenous policy choices, political economy allows to study any 
policy as the outcome of a political decision making process. Thereby political economy 
does not only help to predict the chances of success of an activist approach, but also to 
draw policy implications for those countries which are currently not likely to have good 
enough governance to successfully pursue activist policies. 
The existing literature on the political economy of finance suggests that the assumption of 
interdependencies between private and public agents should frame the political economy 
analysis. Existing work also shows the value of an approach which seeks to explain or 
predict financial policy choices through the analysis of coalitions of interests between pri-
vate and public agents. Thereby the nature of a particular policy coalition and its power to 
                                                 
22 For a more general discussion of this argument with respect to agriculture, see Chang (2000). 
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determine financial policies seems to be particularly shaped by the historically produced 
organisation of the private banking sector vis-à-vis the state, and the revenue base of the 
state. 
If the political economy analysis suggests that the political conditions are favourable, there 
are convincing arguments for supporting well designed activist policies such as subsidies 
or tax incentives as temporary devices to complement modernist approaches. More often 
than not, the political environment is likely to be unfavourable, so that governments must 
pursue strategies other than activism to encourage economic development. Political econ-
omy suggests two main strategies for advisors and policymakers in countries with an un-
favourable environment: One possibility is to try to change the power relationships within 
society, for instance through encouraging political entrepreneurship to empower finan-
cially excluded groups. The alternative is to work within the political environment and for 
example improve the functioning of second-best institutions, such as relationship-lending. 
These arguments entail a new thinking on how to decide about spending resources to build 
inclusive financial systems by emphasising the need to focus on what drives development 
and what is politically feasible. Taking such a pragmatic, but maybe more realistic, ap-
proach requires greater openness for second-best policies: While globally deemed first-
best solutions such as property rights and efficient courts, are crucial for financial devel-
opment, they might be difficult and slow to establish in countries with an unfavourable 
political environment. In such countries a focus on the low-hanging fruit, such as fostering 
relationship-lending schemes or social entrepreneurship might offer limited progress, but 
also a more promising way forward, because through their effect on the political environ-
ment, second-best policies could increase the demand for first-best policies in the longer 
term. 
Translating both implications – to revise financial reform strategies in accordance with the 
results of political economy analysis and to be open to time-bound second-best (including 
activist) solutions – into policy is not straightforward: There is very little research to build 
on that uses a political approach to explore issues of financial reform, and much of it lacks 
operational relevance for the African context. Political economy has not yet received seri-
ous attention in the policy debate on financial reform, in spite of the rhetoric that it is nec-
essary to go beyond the technicalities, and address questions of political feasibility. Rob-
inson (2009, 9) has received much support in policy circles for more generally pointing 
out that “the problem of underdevelopment cannot be solved by economists coming up 
with better policies for poor countries to adopt or endlessly hoping for benevolent ‘leader-
ship’.” It is time to take up the challenge and analyse more systematically how to propose 
financial policies in a way that they are chosen endogenously, and supported by those with 
political and economic power.  
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